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Jonathan Gruber

1Universal Health Insurance Coverage:
Progress & Issues
Jonathan Gruber delivered this lecture on October 2, 2009, 
and his references are to Congressional bills that were under 
consideration on that date.
I’m going to lay out the universal coverage debate that’s gone 
on for a long time in this country. Then I’ll describe a new 
solution that we think we found for Massachusetts, describe how 
the Massachusetts reform works, and how it can be extended 
nationally. Finally I’ll spend time on the key issues that Congress 
is facing right now trying to take this model to the national level.
Setting the Stage
There are really just three issues to consider if you want to get to 
universal health coverage.
1. Pooling
Insurers are like bookies. They don’t want to pick a side; they 
just want to make their profit off the top. They want a nice even 
distribution of risks with a big risk pool; that’s when insurance 
works best. When people wander off the street and say “Hey, I 
want insurance” insurers aren’t happy, because they’re not sure 
what they can predict about that person. Insurance only works 
well when there are large, well integrated pools of individuals who 
come together not on basis of health but the basis of something 
else, like where they work. The fundamental problem in the United 
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States is that the pooling mechanism doesn’t work for individuals 
who can’t get workplace insurance. About two-thirds of the 
uninsured don’t get offered insurance at work, so they have to go 
to the non-group market, which is a harsh, unforgiving place to 
try to buy health insurance. Since it’s not pooled, the prices can 
be high, variable, and most importantly, unpredictable. You can be 
fine buying non-group insurance for ten years; then one day you 
get cancer and the insurance carrier just yanks your non-group 
insurance away or raises your premiums through the roof.
2. Affordability
Health insurance is very expensive. The cost of a typical family 
health insurance plan ($12,680 in 2008, KFF 2009a) is about 50 
percent of a four-person family’s income at the poverty line in 
the US ($22,025 in 2008) and about 20 percent of the median 
income in the US ($50,303 in 2008). It’s implausible to imagine 
we’re going to insure all Americans without government financial 
assistance.
3. Mandates
You can’t get to universal coverage in America, you simply can’t, 
unless you mandate that all individuals have health insurance.
Where Were We Before Reform?
On the Left: Single Payer
Two or three years ago we were in a very polarized place. The 
political left said “The solution is to have a single payer. That 
solves all these problems. The pool, how can you get a bigger risk 
pool than the entire nation? Affordability? It’s free! Free when 
you’re born. And mandate, it’s by default, everyone has health 
insurance.” The only problem is it’s politically infeasible, for 
several reasons. 
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One issue is concerns that with just one giant insurance pool there 
will be reduced innovation in the insurance sector. Insurers won’t 
be able to accomplish some of the creative things they can do to 
try to control costs. Not, I think, as big an issue politically as some 
of the policy economists argue.
The second is that most people are pretty happy with the health 
coverage they already have. People who work for large firms may 
wish it were cheaper, but they value the number of choices and 
they are by and large satisfied. People are not going to be happy if 
you tell them “You have to give up what you like to go into some 
other plan.”
Finally, the United States does not nationalize a $925 billion 
industry (Plunkett Research, Ltd. 2009), it just doesn’t happen. 
The health insurance industry is not going away in this country, so 
quite frankly the single payer option is not worth discussing in the 
current political environment.
On the Right: Tax Credits
The political right said “The answer to solving the affordability 
problem is to give people tax credits to buy private health 
insurance.” If the tax credits were large enough, this would help 
address the affordability problem, but half of the uninsured don’t 
pay taxes. Furthermore, there’s still no pooling mechanism. If I 
have a 15-year-old with cancer and I cannot get health insurance, it 
doesn’t matter to me if there’s a $2,000 tax credit. I still cannot get 
health insurance. Tax credits don’t solve that problem, and by most 
estimates only cause modest increases in insurance affordability.
We were stuck between these two poles. The analogy I like to 
think of here is being in a sea of medical risk, with a very nice 
boat in it. That nice boat is called more expensive insurance. 
There are about 170 million people on that boat. And that boat is 
especially nice because those passengers buy their health insurance 
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with government tax subsidies. Then there are about 50 million 
people swimming in the water screaming for help; they’re the 
uninsured. The people in the boat are waving to them, saying “Yes, 
it’s a shame you’re uninsured. And we’d like to help you.” The 
solution for the left was “Let’s march 170 million people off their 
nice boat into some new government boat that they’ve never seen 
before, and put the other 50 million people on that new boat as 
well.” You can imagine that’s not going to work very well, because 
the original 170 million people won’t be so happy about it. The 
solution on the right was “Let’s throw some hammers and nails to 
the people in the water and let them build their own boat.” Which 
leads to the old story I like to tell of the health policy expert who 
dies and goes to heaven. When he gets to heaven St. Peter says 
“You’re allowed to ask God one question.” So the health policy 
expert asks God, “Will we ever have universal health insurance 
coverage in America?” And God answers, “Yes, but not in my 
lifetime.”
Breaking the Logjam: Massachusetts Health Reform
Onto this stage came what I think is a really phenomenal 
success model in Massachusetts (for a detailed description see 
McDonough et al. 2006). The key insight to what we did in 
Massachusetts was we married the notion of incremental with 
the notion of universal. For instance, incremental—they’ve been 
expanding Medicaid from 100 percent to 110 percent of the 
poverty line, a little change. But incremental by definition means 
building on what we have already. There’s no way you can’t get to 
universal coverage by building on what already works. And that is 
basically the Massachusetts approach.
Key Features of the Massachusetts Plan
Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006 established a system to require 
individuals to obtain health insurance. The key provisions of the 
law are:
Jonathan Gruber
5
1. It provides heavy subsidies for those with family income up 
to 300 percent of the poverty line, about $60,000, to buy health 
insurance.
2. It merges the non-group market, which was not functioning, 
with the small-group market, which was functioning pretty well, 
into a newly formed health insurance marketplace that allows 
individuals to get health insurance at lower group rates. This 
market does not discriminate against people based on their health 
status. Insurers can charge older enrollees more than younger 
enrollees, but they cannot discriminate based on health. There is 
one large pool where sick and healthy alike pay the same price.
3. It establishes an individual mandate. Everyone in the state of 
Massachusetts, with some exceptions I’ll come to, is required to 
buy health insurance or pay about $1,000 tax penalty.
4. It establishes a modest employer obligation. There isn’t very 
much of a role for employers in this system beyond what already 
exists, which is important for the current debate. Employers who 
do not offer health insurance have to pay $300 a year, or 15 cents 
an hour, per worker, to the state, basically nothing.
5. The legislation is deliberately vague, with key decisions made 
by the Health Connector Board of ten experts, of which I’m one, 
which implements the program. This increases flexibility and takes 
many of the politically difficult decisions out of the political arena.
Current Status of the Reform
Where are we now in Massachusetts? First, we newly insured 
about 450,000 people. Our uninsurance rate is 2.7 percent in 2009, 
by far the lowest in the nation (Long and Phadera 2009). It’s about 
one-third of where it was before we started this grand experiment.
Second, employee response to insurance has actually gone up. If 
you ask many economists or policy experts what their fear is with 
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big government intervention in insurance markets, they respond, 
“Workers will leave their employer insurance and go to the new 
government insurance, the so-called crowding out phenomenon.” 
Instead, in Massachusetts workers are crowding in. So not 
only did insurance coverage increase, it happened in a way that 
supplements the private sector rather than displacing it.
Third, the individual mandate, a radically new invention in 
government, turned out to be incredibly administrable. Everyone 
got a new form in the mail, called a 1099HC, which lists the 
policies available for their health insurance. They either fax back 
their tax form or fill out an exception form explaining why they 
weren’t. Ninety-eight percent of taxpayers got that right the very 
first year!
The Massachusetts reform is quite popular. Initially we had about 
75 percent public approval, although that’s down in the most 
recent polls to about 60 percent, as people aren’t happy in the 
recession. But that is still 2-to-1 approval over disapproval of this 
program in the state.
Finally, the Health Connector Board, the expert board making all 
these decisions, did so with virtual consensus, which I think is 
helpful in the political system. So—based on all these factors, I 
think the reform has worked very well. 
Taking this to the National Level: The Big Picture
Cost: A Big Number or a Little One?
There’s no reason this can’t work nationally, except that, of course, 
it’s very expensive. The cost is about $800 million, the federal 
match is about half. Is that a big number or a little number? I can’t 
tell you that. You have to look inside your soul and decide if that’s 
a big number or a little number. What I can tell you is that, relative 
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to what the government currently spends on health insurance, it’s a 
little number. 
Think of it this way. Massachusetts covers about 450,000 people 
for about $800 million, which is about $2,000 a person. Let’s 
compare that to the last major government intervention in health 
insurance, the Medicare part D program, a program that provides 
prescription drugs for the elderly. Medicare Part D costs the 
federal government about $40 billion a year to improve benefits 
for about 10 million elders (Engelhardt and Gruber 2009). That’s 
$4,000 per elder just for their drugs, while Massachusetts is 
covering everybody’s health insurance for $2,000 per person. 
That’s a pretty good outcome. By my estimate it will require about 
$1.2 trillion over ten years to take the Massachusetts approach and 
extend it nationally. 
However, I would argue this is not money down the drain. It is 
consistent with both our short- and long-term economic goals. 
That is, even if you don’t care about the uninsured, even if 
you don’t think it’s a moral issue that we cover the uninsured, 
economically this is well spent money in the short term. This is 
stimulus money that can go through states, and in the medium term 
this is money that should create quality jobs. Let’s face it, jobs in 
the future in the United States will be in the service sector, and 
the health sector can be a great source of quality jobs, particularly 
as we move primary care away from people with eight years of 
medical training and let people take blood pressure after just one 
year of medical training. We can actually make jobs for people 
that don’t have enormous barriers to qualify for them, to help with 
primary care. And in the long term this sets the stage for the real 
battle, which is controlling health care costs.
Incremental Universalism: The Policy Decisions
If you’re going to take the Massachusetts reform national, as we’re 
currently debating doing, there are decisions you have to make. 
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We currently have six proposals: three bills in the House that are 
basically the same, two in the Senate that are quite different, and 
President Obama’s recent speech to a joint session of Congress, 
in which he laid out certain goals to achieve. Let’s look at where 
there is agreement among all these sets of actors and where the 
disagreements arise.
1. Individual Mandate
You cannot get to universal coverage without an individual 
mandate. It’s simply impossible. I know that because today 
one-third to one-half of the uninsured are already offered free 
or heavily subsidized insurance but don’t take it. Four-fifths of 
uninsured kids right now could walk into a Medicaid office and 
get free public health insurance but don’t do it. One-third of the 
uninsured are offered heavily subsidized health insurance by 
their employer, but they don’t take it because they think they’re 
invincible and they don’t need it. So there’s no way to get to 
universal coverage unless you have a mandate. 
Moreover, remember when I talked about the three things you need 
to do—the first one was to enforce pooling. If you want to have 
the health insurance market work, you have to pool the healthy and 
sick. You can’t have just a pool of the sick or it won’t work. The 
problem is you can’t do that without a mandate. Six states have 
tried, including both New York and Massachusetts. Six states have 
passed laws that said, “In the non-group market you can’t charge 
the sick more than the healthy.” So what has happened? Those 
six states are now six of the eight most expensive states in the 
country in which to buy non-group insurance because insurers say, 
“If we can’t tell who’s sick and who’s healthy and charge them 
differently, we’re just going to charge everyone a fortune to make 
sure we don’t lose our shirt on the sick people.” In Massachusetts, 
before we passed our law, a typical individual at age 40 who 
wanted to buy non-group health insurance would pay $8,000 for 
the first year, because insurers had to cover their bases to make 
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sure they were charging enough to cover the inevitably sick people 
who were signing up (America’s Health Insurance Plans 2007). 
Without a mandate that forces the healthy people to come in and 
buy, you can’t get that pooling that’s so important, and, as I said, 
that worked in Massachusetts.
There’s general agreement on this first issue. President Obama, 
after opposing it—to my chagrin—in the primaries and the general 
election, has embraced the individual mandate. There’s a lot of 
differences on the details, but the general principle is supported by 
all six players at this point. That’s a major accomplishment.
2. Employer Responsibility
Here’s where some of the differences lie. What should the role 
of employers be? One view, which is sort of a center-right view, 
is “Employers already help provide health insurance. They’re 
doing their job. Let’s leave them out of this.” The political left 
counters, “But many employers aren’t doing their jobs. They’re 
not providing health insurance. We need to force them into the 
system, make them players in the system.” The extreme version 
of this is the House bills, which I will call the 8 percent pay-or-
play tax, in which employers above a certain size who do not offer 
health insurance have to pay 8 percent of their payroll in a fee to 
the government.
The key point supporters like to raise is that this is “shared 
responsibility.” You have to have employers share responsibility. 
But here’s also where economists call the bluff of the policy 
makers, which is that any charge on an employer is just passed on 
to the workers in the form of lower wages. All you’re really doing 
with employer responsibility is taxing low-wage workers who 
aren’t offered health insurance. It’s not clear why that is something 
you want to do in the next health care reform. 
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Moreover, many people say if we don’t have a pay-or-play system 
for employers then employer-sponsored insurance will go away. 
Once again, we’ve seen in Massachusetts that’s not the case. We 
don’t have a pay-or-play and employer insurance has not gone 
away. But employer responsibility is going to be one of the two or 
three major dividing issues as we attempt to merge the bills in the 
Senate, as we go ultimately to conference.
3. Affordability
The number one issue before Congress is that you can’t mandate 
that people buy health insurance if it costs 40 percent of their 
income. That’s just mean, and it doesn’t work. So what can you 
make work? We could make it free for everybody, as it is in 
Canada; that’s pretty moral and that’s affordable. But it’s a budget 
buster for our government. We need to think about affordability as 
a tradeoff between affordability to people and affordability to the 
government, which is a very hard tradeoff. 
In the House bill insurance will be free until about 150 percent 
of the poverty line, about $30,000 for a family of four. From that 
point, people will start to pay on a rising basis until they get to 
400 percent of the poverty line, or about $80,000 for a family of 
four, about 12.5 percent of their income. So people go from paying 
nothing at about $30,000 to about 12.5 percent of income at 
$80,000 on a rising basis. That is the House’s view of affordable. 
The Senate’s view is that people pay 3 percent of their income 
right at the poverty line, right at $10,000, and the premium rises 
to 13 percent of their income at $60,000. The Senate views 
affordability as people paying much more than the House does. 
There’s a real debate about what is affordable, and there’s no right 
answer here. 
The problem is it starts to go hand in hand with the mandate; you 
can’t mandate insurance that’s not affordable. This is going to 
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be a major issue. Right now there’s a Senate Finance Committee 
bill that costs about $750 billion over ten years and a House of 
Representatives bill that costs about $1.2 trillion over ten years. 
The big difference is: how much are poor people going to pay 
under the mandate? 
That’s the single biggest difference, the only substantive fight. If 
some wonderfully generous donor came forward tomorrow to the 
government and said “Here’s a trillion dollars to pay for health 
insurance,” this thing would be over in two weeks. It’s the money, 
it’s basically raising the money, and how much you want to spend 
on this versus other domestic priorities.
4.	 Minimum	Benefits
You also can’t have a mandate without defining the minimum 
benefit. If you just say there’s a mandate to have health insurance, 
then anyone can start a health insurance company that sells a 
health insurance policy for $1 so people can meet the mandate.
This gets tough because people all have different views about what 
should be in a health insurance plan. The more richly you define 
the minimum package, (a) the more it costs people, so you’re 
mandating they buy some expensive benefits, and (b) the more 
you’re telling people who already have insurance they have to buy 
up. Remember, the goal of this reform is to leave those people who 
are happy alone. For instance, during the presidential campaign 
Hillary Clinton initially said everyone should have health 
insurance that’s as good as members of Congress. But members of 
Congress have health insurance that’s more generous than that of 
90 million Americans, so if you did that you’d be telling 90 million 
Americans “Now you have to buy more expensive insurance than 
you used to buy.” That’s like pulling them right off that boat, that’s 
not going to work. The problem with minimum standards is our 
general liberal instincts to want to cover everything run into the 
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fact that you can’t have an even standard that goes too far above 
what people have today or they’ll revolt.
Isn’t This Rationing?
What I’ve been talking about—paying doctors less and defining 
what’s in the benefit package—is not rationing. What we’re talking 
about is the government establishing the minimum level of benefits 
that we subsidize, after which people can buy as many additional 
benefits as they want. I think that’s very important to keep in mind 
in this debate.
5.	 Tax	Exclusion	of	Employer-Sponsored	Insurance	(ESI)	Benefits
Remember I mentioned the people who are fortunate to buy 
insurance on that nice boat? Here’s why they’re on this nice boat—
because they’re not taxed on the health insurance they get from 
their employers. We have to pay for health reform, and there’s a 
natural way to pay for it—tax their ESI benefits. 
Think of it this way. Let’s say my employer comes to me and 
says, “We want to give you an orthodontia benefit to cover your 
children’s braces. That orthodontia benefit will cost us $1,000. But 
we’re going to offer you a choice. We can give you the orthodontia 
benefit and not give you a raise or we can raise your salary by 
$1,000. Think about it.” Well, the way that I should think about it 
is, is the orthodontia benefit worth $1,000 to me? But that’s not the 
way I think about it. 
Instead, I think: if I get that $1,000 in wages I’m going to be taxed 
on that as income. At my tax rate I’ll only take home $600 from 
the $1,000 in wages. So it’s really $1,000 of orthodontia versus 
$600 in wages. If I take that $1,000 in wages I’m only going to 
keep $600 of it. If I get the $1,000 of orthodontia I keep the whole 
$1,000. So I’ll take the orthodontia benefit.
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Now I’m overinsured, because the government has bribed me to 
be overinsured. By not taxing the health benefit and taxing my 
wages, they have bribed me to overinsure. This tax bribe cost the 
federal government $250 billion this year in lost tax revenues, an 
enormous amount of money. 
Moreover, it’s what we call regressive, that is, the higher wages 
you earn the bigger tax break you get. If my employer pays my 
secretary wages of $1,000 a week, she takes home more like $700 
or $750 dollars compared to my take-home of $600. So it’s a 
bigger tax break for me to get that health insurance instead of the 
wages.
Eliminating this tax exclusion is a natural source of financing 
health care reform except, of course, for the politics. It’s pretty 
hard to defend to constituents, because it feels like a tax increase. 
If the government now taxes some of your health insurance, 
that feels like a tax increase. And that’s not going to fly with the 
American public.
My friend Senator John Kerry actually came up with a clever 
solution, which was debated seriously within the Senate Finance 
Committee. Originally the debate was about capping the taxes. If 
your health insurance is more than a certain level, you get taxed 
on the excess. So if your health insurance costs more than $10,000 
you get taxed on the extra. But that’s the wrong road to follow. 
Kerry suggested, “Let’s tax the insurance companies for selling 
high cost policies.” And that is actually in the Senate Finance 
Committee proposal.
That provides about $250 billion raised over ten years by taxing 
the insurance plans that cost more than $8,000 for an individual 
and $21,000 for a family. Just to get a sense of proportion, that’s 
about the richest 10 percent of health insurance plans, plans with 
the 10 percent most generous benefits.
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6.	 Specificity/Governance
How specific should this legislation be? In Massachusetts our 
legislation was deliberately quite vague. It said things like, “We 
should have a mandate if it’s affordable but we’re not going to 
define affordable. We’re going to have subsidies but we’re not 
going to specify what they are. There should be a minimum benefit 
package but we’re not going to tell you what it is.” And then the 
Health Connector Board had to make all these decisions. I think 
we made them pretty well, and we certainly made them with great 
consensus and in a politically successful way. In some sense the 
Congressional legislation is getting hung up right now on details 
like these, which I would suggest should be left to a process down 
the road, where more expert people can deal with them.
Cost Control
This is an important issue to understand and put in the context of 
the current debate. There are basically two types of cost control.
What I call win-win cost control sounds good and does good. But 
it doesn’t save any money.
 • Invest in information technology, electronic medical records. 
Great idea; it won’t save any money, but it will improve the 
quality of our health care. 
 • Preventive care; great idea, it will improve our health, but 
there’s no evidence it will actually save us any money. 
 • Comparative effectiveness research and guidelines, study 
what works and what doesn’t. How can you be against 
studying what works? But it doesn’t matter just to study it. 
Unless you tell doctors they can’t do it, it’s not going to save 
any money to just know it doesn’t work. We know lots of 
things don’t work that people still get. 
Jonathan Gruber
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The real substance of cost control is all about a single thing: telling 
patients they can’t have something they want.
 • It’s about telling patients, “That surgery doesn’t do any good, 
so if you want it you have to pay the full cost.” It’s basically 
about saying that we as a society are going to have a minimal 
insurance package that reimburses effective treatments but 
that makes people pay on their own for ineffective treatments. 
 • It doesn’t deny treatment. For instance, in England you can’t 
get an organ transplant if you are over a certain age. That may 
be good policy or not, but it will never happen in this country, 
not in our lifetime. 
There’s no reason the American health care system can’t be, “You 
can have whatever you want, you just have to pay for it.” That’s 
what we do in other walks of life. We don’t say everyone has to 
have a large screen TV. If you want a large screen TV, you have to 
pay for it. Basically the notion would be to move to a level where 
everyone has a solid basic insurance level of coverage. Above that 
people pay on their own, without tax-subsidized dollars, to buy a 
higher level of coverage.
The Public Option
The closest we have come to that in the debate is the so-called 
public option. The public option was a brilliant idea of Jacob 
Hacker, a political scientist at Yale. The left wants single payer 
and the right wants no government involvement in health care. 
What if we say we’re going to have an option for people to buy 
government insurance? The left says aha! the government’s 
going to take over. The right is thinking to themselves, aha! the 
government as an insurance provider will be run out of business. 
But both sides have to put their money where their mouth is. If 
they really believe what they believe, how could they be against 
this? If the left really believes it’s better to have the government 
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run insurance, how can they be against having them compete with 
private insurance? If the right really believes the government’s a 
terrible provider of insurance, how can they be against putting it to 
the market test? Very clever idea. But basically what happened was 
that the left realized the public option wasn’t as good as a single 
payer and the right realized that the government might actually 
succeed. So at the end it’s become very unpopular.
Two Elements of the Public Option
There are two elements to the public option, one meaningful, the 
other meaningless. 
 • The public option provides a mechanism for the government to 
regulate provider rates. 
This is important. There’s a fundamental problem with the market 
negotiation between insurers and providers. In the 1970s health 
care providers charged whatever they wanted insurers to pay them. 
Then, starting to ease into the mid-90s, insurers began saying to 
the hospitals, “We’re not going to send you patients unless you 
give us a discount.” To which the hospitals responded, “Oh, OK! 
Here’s a big discount!” and health care costs actually grew less 
than inflation from 1995 through 1997. Then in the late 1990s 
the providers woke up: “Nobody’s going to buy insurance if it 
doesn’t include us in the network. We can charge whatever we 
want!” Providers realized they had what is called in economics 
monopsony power (in a market dominated by a single buyer, the 
market power to set the price of whatever it is buying). They had 
the power that comes from their strong reputations. As a result, 
it is very hard to allow competition to actually get that market to 
work. You need regulation. 
Part of the public option that would have worked well would have 
been to actually regulate rates. The public option would have paid 
Medicare rates. Now, one might argue the Medicare rate is too 
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low. Should the rate be Medicare plus 5 percent, or Medicare plus 
10 percent? I can’t tell you. The key point is, if we’re going to 
get health care costs under control we’re going to have to include 
some rate regulation by the government as part of that ultimate 
package.
That part is dead in the water. First, doctors don’t like it. Second, 
the insurance companies don’t like it because they know if there’s 
a public option available at lower rates then the public option 
will wipe them out. The doctors and the insurers formed a pact 
opposing this bill. So while lower rates, that part of the public 
option, is in the House bill it’s not going to happen.
 • The public option provides competition to keep private insurers 
honest.
Unfortunately, this is what the debate has actually focused on. 
When you hear about the public option it’s not about the rates, 
it’s about how we need a government run insurance plan to keep 
the private insurers honest. But this is just not a big deal. Yes, 
insurance markets aren’t that competitive. But if you have an 
insurance market and add one more insurer, even the federal 
government, it’s not going to make it that much more competitive. 
If the public option pays the same rates as the private sector it just 
isn’t that big a deal.
That’s why I predict the final bill will have no public option, or 
if it does it will have some incredibly toothless version triggered 
in the year 2073. This debate has gotten far more attention than it 
deserves.
Moving Forward Incrementally
The public is not yet ready to perceive the need for health care 
reform as a crisis. The analogy is something like the different 
responses to global warming and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
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For about 20 years, up until the 1970s, we used aerosols with 
CFCs (non-reactive, non-flammable, and non-toxic propellants) 
in them. But evidence started to accumulate that CFCs might 
destroy the ozone layer, which protects human and animal life 
by absorbing ultraviolet rays from the sun. So the United States 
banned the production of CFCs in 1977. Then, in 1985, an article 
documenting an overlooked hole in the ozone over Antarctica 
appeared, and all of a sudden people went “There’s a hole in 
the ozone layer! We have to do something about it!” Several 
countries got together, banned chlorofluorocarbons, and the 
chlorofluorocarbon market today is 3 percent of what it used to be. 
It worked! 
By comparison, global warming is a much weightier issue. Skin 
cancer is bad but drowning is worse. But there’s no hole in the 
ozone layer, there’s no parallel shocking revelation, and that’s why 
we aren’t moving forward on global warming.
Health care reform is similar. We all know it’s a problem. We all 
know that the US is being bankrupted by rapidly rising health care 
costs. Just to finance the Medicare program, to put it on a solid 
footing for the foreseeable future, would require imposing a 15 
percent payroll tax. Every person in America would have to pay 
15 percent of their wages to the government, basically doubling 
the tax burden of most American families. This is a huge long-run 
problem. 
But it’s not a short-run problem. Sure, we would like health care to 
be a little cheaper, or the cost to rise more slowly, but Americans 
aren’t ready to deal with the hard measures we’d have to take to 
get health care costs under control. That’s why I’ve been arguing 
strenuously that even though the bills that will come out of this 
process in the end won’t do a whole lot about cost control, they’re 
still a critical first step. Because, to wax political economy here for 
a second, what’s the history of health care reform in the US? We 
have tried on average every 17.9 years for the last 50 years to have 
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a major health reform, and every time it’s been killed because the 
people who would get hurt by cost controls have opposed it. 
Divide and Conquer: First Universal Coverage, Then Cost Control
So what’s different this time? Why are we closer than we’ve ever 
been before? Because there are no cost controls in these proposals. 
Because this bill’s about coverage. Which is good! Why should we 
hold 48 million uninsured people hostage to the fact that we don’t 
yet know how to control costs in a politically acceptable way? 
Let’s get the people covered and then let’s do cost control.
Now you might say “That’s a leap of faith—just getting people 
covered makes the costs go up.” But look at what happened in 
Massachusetts. They pushed through a universal coverage bill. 
About six months later they realized, “Whoa, wait a second! 
We’d better get health care costs under control or we’re not 
going to be able to afford this program.” So they lobbied and the 
Massachusetts legislature passed one of the most important health 
care cost control pieces of legislation in the country, which set up a 
commission that recommended—we’re working on the legislation 
now—to move to a new physician reimbursement system to try to 
deal with some of the excesses that these powerful hospitals are 
charging for care. That happened because first we got to universal 
coverage. Now everyone is pulling in the same direction. 
It’s the same in the US. We need to get the coverage question 
out of the way, get everyone pulling in the same direction, and 
then we’ll get to cost control. But if people hold out for a bill 
that controls health care costs we won’t have a bill. And then 48 
million people, 50 million a year later, and so on, will still be 
uninsured. That really is a moral failure.
That’s why I say, let’s not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. 
Let’s get the bill done now that covers people for health insurance, 
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and then let’s move forward to cost control as we can do it, as we 
go along.
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